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AI-Driven Security Enhancements for OpenBSD Kernel
Noone said all added checks are useless. But adding these to OpenBSD without human verification is extremely unlikely. I'd say continue with your projects, go over the changes yourself, reason if they are sane and if you've convinced yourself chop up the good bits into reasonably sized patches and send them to the list. Maybe start of with a single change and slowly ramp up the amount in a single diff once you get some traction. martijn@ On Tue, 2024-06-11 at 09:28 -0300, Alfredo Ortega wrote: > I added 10000+ checks so far, in about 4 or 5 hs. Final count will > likely be close to a million. > It's true that many are useless, perhaps up to 50% of them. Most > stack protections put into place by the compiler are also useless. > But the question is, how many are not useless? and how many checks > humans missed, but the AI correctly put in place? > How many vulnerabilities are catched by those new checks? Those are > the important metrics imho. > > El mar, 11 jun 2024 a las 8:59, Stuart Henderson > (<stu@spacehopper.org>) escribió: > > > > On 2024/06/11 07:41, Alfredo Ortega wrote: > > > But the fact that whole netinet/netinet6 10000+ checks were added with > > > no human intervention and produced a working, arguably safer kernel, > > > is surprising to me. > > > Beware that at the current state, it might not be actually safer as > > > the checks may actually introduce new bugs. > > > > So, 10000+ checks, impossible to properly review, but some of which are > > obviously at best useless, and even the person showing the changes warns > > (correctly) that they may introduce bugs. This doesn't really seem a > > good topic for tech@, perhaps misc if anywhere. > > >
AI-Driven Security Enhancements for OpenBSD Kernel