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rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
On Tue, Nov 18, 2025 at 02:25:12PM +0100, Theo Buehler wrote: > On Tue, Nov 18, 2025 at 01:18:21PM +0000, Job Snijders wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 18, 2025 at 02:02:28PM +0100, Claudio Jeker wrote: > > > Yes, SIDROPS is a headless chicken. Still I think it is their job to > > > fix this inconsistency in the BGPsec spec. > > > > I'll file an errata. > > > > > > In any case, I think the current logic is error prone since this > > > > mis-specification is about the subject. Can we do this small > > > > refactor which is the bulk of the original diff? > > > > > > Sorry, I forgot to add that I'm OK with your original diff. There is not > > > much else we can do about this in rpki-client right now. > > > > We should not put any effort in supporting UTF8String in the BGPsec > > certificate context. Let's treat the commonName attribute in BGPsec > > certs the same way we do in any other RPKI certificate types. > > so you're ok with my second diff? You can have an OK claudio@ on that one :) -- :wq Claudio
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects
rpki-client: allow UTF8String for BGPsec router cert subjects