On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 12:50:05PM +0000, Job Snijders wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 20, 2026 at 09:02:12AM +0100, Theo Buehler wrote:
> > This is an almost entirely mechanical diff. The pkey hanging off
> > struct tal always confuses me since pkey always makes me think of
> > EVP_PKEY. The combo with pk and opk in a couple of functions makes
> > this worse.
> > 
> > So: rename tal->pkey{,sz} to tal->spki{,sz} and pk/opk to pkey/opkey
> > and adjust a couple of nearby comments. Update from RFC 7730 to RFC
> > 8630 while there.
> 
> To me it is not immediately clear from the new (or old) variable names
> 'pkey' and 'opkey' what those variables might contain, perhaps the names
> 'tal_pkey' and 'cert_pkey' would've been more descriptive? Anyhow...

So here's the rename you requested. I will do a %s/badcert/out followup
in cert.c to get that out of the way.

Index: cert.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/cert.c,v
diff -u -p -r1.212 cert.c
--- cert.c	20 Jan 2026 16:49:03 -0000	1.212
+++ cert.c	20 Jan 2026 16:52:10 -0000
@@ -1937,20 +1937,20 @@ static int
 ta_check_pubkey(const char *fn, struct cert *cert, const unsigned char *spki,
     size_t spkisz)
 {
-	EVP_PKEY	*pk, *opk;
+	EVP_PKEY	*cert_pkey, *tal_pkey;
 	int		 rv = 0;
 
 	/* first check pubkey against the one from the TAL */
-	pk = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &spki, spkisz);
-	if (pk == NULL) {
+	tal_pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &spki, spkisz);
+	if (tal_pkey == NULL) {
 		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): bad TAL pubkey", fn);
 		goto badcert;
 	}
-	if ((opk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
+	if ((cert_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL) {
 		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): missing pubkey", fn);
 		goto badcert;
 	}
-	if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pk, opk) != 1) {
+	if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_pkey, tal_pkey) != 1) {
 		warnx("%s: RFC 6487 (trust anchor): "
 		    "pubkey does not match TAL pubkey", fn);
 		goto badcert;
@@ -1960,14 +1960,14 @@ ta_check_pubkey(const char *fn, struct c
 	 * Do not replace with a <= 0 check since OpenSSL 3 broke that:
 	 * https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/24575
 	 */
-	if (X509_verify(cert->x509, pk) != 1) {
+	if (X509_verify(cert->x509, tal_pkey) != 1) {
 		warnx("%s: failed to verify signature", fn);
 		goto badcert;
 	}
 
 	rv = 1;
  badcert:
-	EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(tal_pkey);
 	return rv;
 }
 
Index: filemode.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/filemode.c,v
diff -u -p -r1.77 filemode.c
--- filemode.c	20 Jan 2026 16:49:03 -0000	1.77
+++ filemode.c	20 Jan 2026 16:52:10 -0000
@@ -283,11 +283,11 @@ out:
 static struct tal *
 find_tal(struct cert *cert)
 {
-	EVP_PKEY	*pk, *opk;
+	EVP_PKEY	*cert_pkey, *tal_pkey;
 	struct tal	*tal;
 	int		 i;
 
-	if ((opk = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL)
+	if ((cert_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert->x509)) == NULL)
 		return NULL;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < TALSZ_MAX; i++) {
@@ -297,14 +297,14 @@ find_tal(struct cert *cert)
 			break;
 		tal = talobj[i];
 		spki = tal->spki;
-		pk = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &spki, tal->spkisz);
-		if (pk == NULL)
+		tal_pkey = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, &spki, tal->spkisz);
+		if (tal_pkey == NULL)
 			continue;
-		if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(pk, opk) == 1) {
-			EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+		if (EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_pkey, tal_pkey) == 1) {
+			EVP_PKEY_free(tal_pkey);
 			return tal;
 		}
-		EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+		EVP_PKEY_free(tal_pkey);
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }