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relayd reload race crash
On Sun Mar 01, 2026 at 05:50:55AM -0800, Nick Owens wrote:
> hello rafael,
>
> On Sun, Mar 01, 2026 at 09:47:54AM +0100, Rafael Sadowski wrote:
> > Hi Nick Owens,
> >
> > do you have a minimal test setup to to reproduce that? Comments below.
>
> my apologies. i did not inclue what i originally wrote to bugs@ in one
> of my replies..
Thanks, that always makes it easier!
>
> https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-bugs&m=177018029002894&w=2
>
> doas watch -s 0.1 relayctl -s /tmp/relayd.sock reload
>
> watch -s 0 curl -kso /dev/null https://127.0.0.1:444
>
> fugu$ cat x.conf
> socket "/tmp/relayd.sock"
> table <www> { 127.0.0.1 }
> http protocol "proxy" {
> tls keypair "test"
> return error
> }
>
> relay "https" {
> listen on 0.0.0.0 port 444 tls
> protocol "proxy"
> forward to <www> port 80
> }
>
> fugu$ doas ./obj/relayd -d -f x.conf
> startup
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> <snip>
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> adding 1 hosts from table www:80 (no check)
> ca: ca_dispatch_relay: invalid relay hash 'SHA256:764076891ced15921fb2ec023df3232c194dccac8c6b9fde2565ca01ed13874d'
> hce exiting, pid 71488
> pfe exiting, pid 40741
> ca exiting, pid 48707
> relay: pipe closed
> lost child: pid 39177 exited abnormally
> ca exiting, pid 20355
> lost child: pid 71618 exited abnormally
> relay exiting, pid 83235
> relay exiting, pid 71571
> parent terminating, pid 32006
>
> >
> > On Sat Feb 28, 2026 at 10:59:22PM -0800, Nick Owens wrote:
> > > On Tue, Feb 10, 2026 at 04:34:08PM -0800, Nick Owens wrote:
> > > > On Tue, Feb 03, 2026 at 10:15:20PM -0800, Nick Owens wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Feb 04, 2026 at 03:51:11PM +1000, Paul W. Rankin wrote:
> > > > > > > On 04/02/2026 1:58 PM AEST mischief () offblast ! org wrote:
> > > > > > > this was brought up by rnkn on IRC,
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I'm just looping myself in here. Thanks.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > one approach is to return negative cko_tlen back to rsae_send_imsg. this
> > > > > might result in some broken tls connections, but its better than taking
> > > > > down all of relayd.
> > > > >
> > > > > a better fix would probably be to temporarily stop processing rsa ops
> > > > > altogether while reload is happening, but i'm not sure of a good
> > > > > approach for that.
> > > > >
> > > > > Index: ca.c
> > > > > ===================================================================
> > > > > RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/relayd/ca.c,v
> > > > > diff -u -p -r1.45 ca.c
> > > > > --- ca.c 21 Nov 2024 13:21:34 -0000 1.45
> > > > > +++ ca.c 4 Feb 2026 06:03:33 -0000
> > > > > @@ -234,9 +234,15 @@ ca_dispatch_relay(int fd, struct privsep
> > > > > fatalx("%s: invalid relay proc", __func__);
> > > > > if (IMSG_DATA_SIZE(imsg) != (sizeof(cko) + cko.cko_flen))
> > > > > fatalx("%s: invalid key operation", __func__);
> > > > > - if ((pkey = pkey_find(env, cko.cko_hash)) == NULL)
> > > > > - fatalx("%s: invalid relay hash '%s'",
> >
> > Yes I think this is to aggressive during a reload process.
> >
> > > > > + if ((pkey = pkey_find(env, cko.cko_hash)) == NULL) {
> > > > > + log_warnx("%s: invalid relay hash '%s'",
> > > > > __func__, cko.cko_hash);
> > > > > + cko.cko_tlen = -1;
> > > > > + if (proc_compose_imsg(env->sc_ps, PROC_RELAY, cko.cko_proc,
> > > > > + imsg->hdr.type, -1, -1, &cko, sizeof(cko)) == -1)
> > > > > + log_warn("%s: proc_composev_imsg", __func__);
> > > > > + break;
> > > > > + }
> > > > > if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)) == NULL)
> > > > > fatalx("%s: invalid relay key", __func__);
> >
> > If we go this way, we need to handle this too.
> >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > > ping. here is an alternate approach to stop processing imsgs from PROC_RELAY by removing the events during reload, but when testing i still had client connections get empty replies, closed early, or the rsa op timed out. however, relayd also does not crash.
> >
> > The fix replaces a crash with a broken connection?
> >
> > >
> > > ping again. i hope this will be fixed for the next release.
> > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/ca.c b/usr.sbin/relayd/ca.c
> > > > index e54259c5971..89f7f48685e 100644
> > > > --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/ca.c
> > > > +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/ca.c
> > > > @@ -204,9 +204,11 @@ ca_dispatch_parent(int fd, struct privsep_proc *p, struct imsg *imsg)
> > > > break;
> > > > case IMSG_CTL_START:
> > > > ca_launch();
> > > > + proc_unblock(p->p_ps, PROC_RELAY);
> > > > break;
> > > > case IMSG_CTL_RESET:
> > > > config_getreset(env, imsg);
> > > > + proc_block(p->p_ps, PROC_RELAY);
> > > > break;
> > > > default:
> > > > return -1;
> > > > diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/proc.c b/usr.sbin/relayd/proc.c
> > > > index 3eb00aa0381..56a49120cb4 100644
> > > > --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/proc.c
> > > > +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/proc.c
> > > > @@ -682,6 +682,38 @@ proc_dispatch_null(int fd, struct privsep_proc *p, struct imsg *imsg)
> > > > return (-1);
> > > > }
> > > >
> > > > +void
> > > > +proc_block(struct privsep *ps, enum privsep_procid id)
> > > > +{
> > > > + struct imsgev *iev;
> > > > + int n, m;
> > > > +
> > > > + n = -1;
> > > > +
> > > > + proc_range(ps, id, &n, &m);
> > > > +
> > > > + for(; n < m; n++){
> > > > + iev = &ps->ps_ievs[id][n];
> > > > + event_del(&iev->ev);
> > > > + }
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > +void
> > > > +proc_unblock(struct privsep *ps, enum privsep_procid id)
> > > > +{
> > > > + struct imsgev *iev;
> > > > + int n, m;
> > > > +
> > > > + n = -1;
> > > > +
> > > > + proc_range(ps, id, &n, &m);
> > > > +
> > > > + for(; n < m; n++){
> > > > + iev = &ps->ps_ievs[id][n];
> > > > + event_add(&iev->ev, NULL);
> > > > + }
> > > > +}
> > > > +
> > > > /*
> > > > * imsg helper functions
> > > > */
> > > > diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> > > > index 3b5c3987f93..697c3bd8b48 100644
> > > > --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> > > > +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> > > > @@ -1451,6 +1451,8 @@ int imsg_compose_event(struct imsgev *, uint16_t, uint32_t,
> > > > pid_t, int, void *, uint16_t);
> > > > int imsg_composev_event(struct imsgev *, uint16_t, uint32_t,
> > > > pid_t, int, const struct iovec *, int);
> > > > +void proc_block(struct privsep *, enum privsep_procid);
> > > > +void proc_unblock(struct privsep *, enum privsep_procid);
> > > >
> > > > /* config.c */
> > > > int config_init(struct relayd *);
> > >
> >
> > Is a workaround and not a fix for the root of the problem. Are you
> > agree?
>
> yes, broken client connections aren't ideal, but i feel it's better than
> relayd giving up the ghost entirely if for example in the extremely
> common case, one is using crontab like i do:
>
> @weekly acme-client example.com && rcctl reload relayd
>
> today if you do this you are simply playing russian roulette with your
> webserver.
>
> thanks,
> nick
>
As described above, I think that ending a direct reply with an error
(-1) to the sender is the right approach to prevent a fatal crash during
configuration reloads. It ensures the relay worker is unblocked
immediately (not wait for the timeout) even if a key is temporarily
unavailable (as in our race, due to the reload).
OK?
diff --git a/ca.c b/ca.c
index 167fb1c..3515977 100644
--- a/ca.c
+++ b/ca.c
@@ -234,11 +234,33 @@ ca_dispatch_relay(int fd, struct privsep_proc *p, struct imsg *imsg)
fatalx("%s: invalid relay proc", __func__);
if (IMSG_DATA_SIZE(imsg) != (sizeof(cko) + cko.cko_flen))
fatalx("%s: invalid key operation", __func__);
- if ((pkey = pkey_find(env, cko.cko_hash)) == NULL)
- fatalx("%s: invalid relay hash '%s'",
+
+ if ((pkey = pkey_find(env, cko.cko_hash)) == NULL) {
+ log_warnx("%s: invalid relay hash '%s'",
__func__, cko.cko_hash);
- if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)) == NULL)
- fatalx("%s: invalid relay key", __func__);
+ /* Signal failure to the waiting relay worker. */
+ cko.cko_tlen = -1;
+ iov[c].iov_base = &cko;
+ iov[c++].iov_len = sizeof(cko);
+ if (proc_composev_imsg(env->sc_ps, PROC_RELAY,
+ cko.cko_proc, imsg->hdr.type, -1, -1, iov,
+ c) == -1)
+ log_warn("%s: proc_composev_imsg", __func__);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) {
+ log_warnx("%s: invalid relay key", __func__);
+ /* Signal failure to the waiting relay worker. */
+ cko.cko_tlen = -1;
+ iov[c].iov_base = &cko;
+ iov[c++].iov_len = sizeof(cko);
+ if (proc_composev_imsg(env->sc_ps, PROC_RELAY,
+ cko.cko_proc, imsg->hdr.type, -1, -1, iov,
+ c) == -1)
+ log_warn("%s: proc_composev_imsg", __func__);
+ break;
+ }
DPRINTF("%s:%d: key hash %s proc %d",
__func__, __LINE__, cko.cko_hash, cko.cko_proc);
@@ -392,7 +414,11 @@ rsae_send_imsg(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
fatalx("invalid response");
ret = cko.cko_tlen;
- if (ret > 0) {
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ log_warnx("%s: priv%s failed for key %s",
+ __func__, cmd == IMSG_CA_PRIVENC ?
+ "enc" : "dec", cko.cko_hash);
+ } else if (ret > 0) {
if (IMSG_DATA_SIZE(&imsg) !=
(sizeof(cko) + ret))
fatalx("data size");
relayd reload race crash