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relayd: support explicit paths for keypair
On Sat, 09 May 2026 14:59:45 +0200,
Rafael Sadowski <rafael@sizeofvoid.org> wrote:
>
> On Sun Mar 29, 2026 at 03:31:40PM +0200, Kirill A. Korinsky wrote:
> > On Wed, 18 Mar 2026 17:47:42 +0100,
> > Rafael Sadowski <rafael@sizeofvoid.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Thu Feb 19, 2026 at 09:28:17PM +0100, Rafael Sadowski wrote:
> > > > The following diff extends the keypair keyword in relayd.conf to allow
> > > > explicit path specifications for certificates, private keys, and OCSP
> > > > staple files.
> > > >
> > > > Currently, relayd relies on a fixed lookup logic, searching for TLS
> > > > crt/key in /etc/ssl and /etc/ssl/private based on the keypair name and
> > > > port.
> > > >
> > > > That has always annoyed me, since all other applications must comply
> > > > with the naming convention of relayd.
> > > >
> > > > The idea is simple, the keypair statement now supports optional
> > > > certificate, key, and ocsp keywords followed by a path:
> > > >
> > > > keypair name [certificate path [key path [ocsp path]]].
> > >
> > > Is anyone interested?
> > >
> >
> > I think this is worth to be introduced. We already has in smptd.conf:
> >
> > pki pkiname cert certfile
> >
> > pki pkiname key keyfile
> >
> > And this is the way to somehow stay alligned.
> >
> > Personally, I think we need also support of keypair keyword in smtpd.conf,
> > but it is different diff.
> >
> > Not sure that keypair here is good name, maybe smtpd.conf way is cleaner.
> >
>
> Here is a rework of my latest diff after feedback from tb@ (Thanks!).
>
> - KNF and syntax fixes
> - Added PATH_MAX check in proto_keyname
> - Added missing free($*)
> - Added strlcpy truncation checks
> - Use secure snprintf idiom from manpage
>
> OK?
>
Probably I do something wrong. I've tried config:
table <httpd> { 127.0.0.1 }
http protocol https {
tls keypair xxx cert /etc/ssl/test.crt key /etc/ssl/private/test.key
}
relay https {
listen on egress port 443 tls
protocol https
forward to <httpd> port 80
}
and it fails as:
relayd.conf:4: syntax error
relayd.conf:9: no such protocol: https
no actions, nothing to do
>
> diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/parse.y b/usr.sbin/relayd/parse.y
> index 6c3d538ed4e..5282afda091 100644
> --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/parse.y
> +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/parse.y
> @@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ int relay_id(struct relay *);
> struct relay *relay_inherit(struct relay *, struct relay *);
> int getservice(char *);
> int is_if_in_group(const char *, const char *);
> +static struct keyname *proto_keyname(char *);
>
> typedef struct {
> union {
> @@ -1342,20 +1343,93 @@ tlsflags : SESSION TICKETS { proto->tickets = 1; }
> free($3);
> }
> | KEYPAIR STRING {
> - struct keyname *name;
> + struct keyname *kname = NULL;
>
> - if (strlen($2) >= PATH_MAX) {
> - yyerror("keypair name too long");
> + if ((kname = proto_keyname($2)) == NULL) {
> free($2);
> YYERROR;
> }
> - if ((name = calloc(1, sizeof(*name))) == NULL) {
> - yyerror("calloc");
> + free($2);
> + }
> + | KEYPAIR STRING CERTIFICATE STRING {
> + struct keyname *kname = NULL;
> +
> + if ((kname = proto_keyname($2)) == NULL) {
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> +
> + if (strlen($4) >= PATH_MAX) {
> + yyerror("keypair cert too long");
> free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> + if (strlcpy(kname->certificate, $4,
> + sizeof(kname->certificate)) >=
> + sizeof(kname->certificate)) {
> + yyerror("keypair certificate truncated");
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> YYERROR;
> }
> - name->name = $2;
> - TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&proto->tlscerts, name, entry);
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + }
> + | KEYPAIR STRING KEY STRING {
> + struct keyname *kname = NULL;
> +
> + if ((kname = proto_keyname($2)) == NULL) {
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> +
> + if (strlen($4) >= PATH_MAX) {
> + yyerror("keypair certificate key too long");
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> +
> + if (strlcpy(kname->key, $4,
> + sizeof(kname->key)) >=
> + sizeof(kname->key)) {
> + yyerror("keypair certificate key truncated");
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + }
> + | KEYPAIR STRING OCSP STRING {
> + struct keyname *kname = NULL;
> +
> + if ((kname = proto_keyname($2)) == NULL) {
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> +
> + if (strlen($4) >= PATH_MAX) {
> + yyerror("keypair ocsp file too long");
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> +
> + if (strlcpy(kname->ocsp, $4,
> + sizeof(kname->ocsp)) >=
> + sizeof(kname->ocsp)) {
> + yyerror("ocsp truncated");
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> + YYERROR;
> + }
> + free($2);
> + free($4);
> }
> | CLIENT CA STRING {
> if (strlcpy(proto->tlsclientca, $3,
> @@ -1850,7 +1924,7 @@ relay : RELAY STRING {
> } '{' optnl relayopts_l '}' {
> struct relay *r;
> struct relay_config *rlconf = &rlay->rl_conf;
> - struct keyname *name;
> + struct keyname *kname;
>
> if (relay_findbyname(conf, rlconf->name) != NULL ||
> relay_findbyaddr(conf, rlconf) != NULL) {
> @@ -1888,11 +1962,11 @@ relay : RELAY STRING {
> rlay->rl_conf.name);
> YYERROR;
> }
> - TAILQ_FOREACH(name, &rlay->rl_proto->tlscerts, entry) {
> + TAILQ_FOREACH(kname, &rlay->rl_proto->tlscerts, entry) {
> if (relay_load_certfiles(conf,
> - rlay, name->name) == -1) {
> + rlay, kname) == -1) {
> yyerror("cannot load keypair %s"
> - " for relay %s", name->name,
> + " for relay %s", kname->name,
> rlay->rl_conf.name);
> YYERROR;
> }
> @@ -3452,7 +3526,7 @@ relay_inherit(struct relay *ra, struct relay *rb)
> goto err;
> }
> TAILQ_FOREACH(name, &rb->rl_proto->tlscerts, entry) {
> - if (relay_load_certfiles(conf, rb, name->name) == -1) {
> + if (relay_load_certfiles(conf, rb, name) == -1) {
> yyerror("cannot load keypair %s for relay %s",
> name->name, rb->rl_conf.name);
> goto err;
> @@ -3551,3 +3625,31 @@ end:
> close(s);
> return (ret);
> }
> +
> +struct keyname*
> +proto_keyname(char *name)
> +{
> + struct keyname *kname = NULL, *key;
> +
> + if (strlen(name) >= PATH_MAX) {
> + yyerror("keypair name too long");
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> +
> + TAILQ_FOREACH(key, &proto->tlscerts, entry) {
> + if (strcmp(key->name, name) == 0)
> + return key;
> + }
> +
> + if ((kname = calloc(1, sizeof(*kname))) == NULL) {
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> + if ((kname->name = strdup(name)) == NULL) {
> + free(kname);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&proto->tlscerts, kname, entry);
> + return kname;
> +}
> diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.c b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.c
> index 9eb1b452d81..e3667a15dae 100644
> --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.c
> +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.c
> @@ -1335,14 +1335,14 @@ relay_load_fd(int fd, off_t *len)
> }
>
> int
> -relay_load_certfiles(struct relayd *env, struct relay *rlay, const char *name)
> +relay_load_certfiles(struct relayd *env, struct relay *rlay, const struct keyname *name)
> {
> char certfile[PATH_MAX];
> char hbuf[PATH_MAX];
> struct protocol *proto = rlay->rl_proto;
> struct relay_cert *cert;
> int useport = htons(rlay->rl_conf.port);
> - int cert_fd = -1, key_fd = -1, ocsp_fd = -1;
> + int cert_fd = -1, key_fd = -1, ocsp_fd = -1, ret = 0;
>
> if (rlay->rl_conf.flags & F_TLSCLIENT) {
> if (strlen(proto->tlsca) && rlay->rl_tls_ca_fd == -1) {
> @@ -1385,15 +1385,29 @@ relay_load_certfiles(struct relayd *env, struct relay *rlay, const char *name)
> print_host(&rlay->rl_conf.ss, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)) == NULL)
> goto fail;
> else if (name != NULL &&
> - strlcpy(hbuf, name, sizeof(hbuf)) >= sizeof(hbuf))
> + strlcpy(hbuf, name->name, sizeof(hbuf)) >= sizeof(hbuf))
> goto fail;
>
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/%s:%u.crt", hbuf, useport) == -1)
> - goto fail;
> + if (name != NULL && strcmp(name->certificate, "") != 0) {
> + if (strlcpy(certfile, name->certificate, sizeof(certfile))
> + >= sizeof(certfile)) {
> + log_warnx("certificate truncated");
> + goto fail;
> + }
> + }
> + else {
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/%s:%u.crt", hbuf, useport);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> + goto fail;
> + }
> if ((cert_fd = open(certfile, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/%s.crt", hbuf) == -1)
> +
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/%s.crt", hbuf);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> goto fail;
> if ((cert_fd = open(certfile, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
> goto fail;
> @@ -1401,27 +1415,56 @@ relay_load_certfiles(struct relayd *env, struct relay *rlay, const char *name)
> }
> log_debug("%s: using certificate %s", __func__, certfile);
>
> - if (useport) {
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/private/%s:%u.key", hbuf, useport) == -1)
> - goto fail;
> - } else {
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/private/%s.key", hbuf) == -1)
> + if (name != NULL && strcmp(name->key, "") != 0) {
> + if (strlcpy(certfile, name->key, sizeof(certfile))
> + >= sizeof(certfile)) {
> + log_warnx("certificate key truncated");
> goto fail;
> + }
> + }
> + else {
> + if (useport) {
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/private/%s:%u.key",
> + hbuf, useport);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> + goto fail;
> + } else {
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/private/%s.key", hbuf);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> + goto fail;
> + }
> }
> if ((key_fd = open(certfile, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
> goto fail;
> log_debug("%s: using private key %s", __func__, certfile);
>
> - if (useport) {
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/%s:%u.ocsp", hbuf, useport) == -1)
> - goto fail;
> - } else {
> - if (snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> - "/etc/ssl/%s.ocsp", hbuf) == -1)
> + if (name != NULL && strcmp(name->ocsp, "") != 0) {
> + if (strlcpy(certfile, name->ocsp, sizeof(certfile))
> + >= sizeof(certfile)) {
> + log_warnx("certificate ocsp truncated");
> goto fail;
> + }
> +
> + }
> + else {
> + if (useport) {
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/%s:%u.ocsp",
> + hbuf, useport);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> + goto fail;
> + } else {
> + ret = snprintf(certfile, sizeof(certfile),
> + "/etc/ssl/%s.ocsp", hbuf);
> +
> + if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(certfile))
> + goto fail;
> + }
> }
> if ((ocsp_fd = open(certfile, O_RDONLY)) != -1)
> log_debug("%s: using OCSP staple file %s", __func__, certfile);
> diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.conf.5 b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.conf.5
> index a63dd4e3a41..8803b57c73b 100644
> --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.conf.5
> +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.conf.5
> @@ -997,8 +997,10 @@ is omitted,
> is used.
> The default is
> .Ic no edh .
> -.It Ic keypair Ar name
> -The relay will attempt to look up a private key in
> +.It Ic keypair Ar name Op Ic cert Ar path Op Ic key Ar path Op Ic ocsp Ar path
> +The relay will attempt to look up the TLS assets associated with
> +.Ar name .
> +By default, it searches for a private key in
> .Pa /etc/ssl/private/name:port.key
> and a public certificate in
> .Pa /etc/ssl/name:port.crt ,
> @@ -1009,6 +1011,16 @@ If these files are not present, the relay will continue to look in
> .Pa /etc/ssl/private/name.key
> and
> .Pa /etc/ssl/name.crt .
> +.Pp
> +If the
> +.Ic cert ,
> +.Ic key ,
> +or
> +.Ic ocsp
> +keywords are followed by an explicit
> +.Ar path ,
> +that file will be used instead of the default location.
> +.Pp
> This option can be specified multiple times for TLS Server Name Indication.
> If not specified,
> a keypair will be loaded using the specified IP address of the relay as
> @@ -1017,8 +1029,10 @@ See
> .Xr ssl 8
> for details about TLS server certificates.
> .Pp
> -An optional OCSP staple file will be used during TLS handshakes with
> -this server if it is found as a non-empty file in
> +An optional OCSP staple file will be used during TLS handshakes.
> +If no explicit
> +.Ic ocsp Ar path
> +is given, it will be searched as a non-empty file in
> .Pa /etc/ssl/name:port.ocsp
> or
> .Pa /etc/ssl/name.ocsp .
> diff --git a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> index a5363989f4b..1756d9aec7a 100644
> --- a/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> +++ b/usr.sbin/relayd/relayd.h
> @@ -726,6 +726,9 @@ struct relay_ticket_key {
> struct keyname {
> TAILQ_ENTRY(keyname) entry;
> char *name;
> + char certificate[PATH_MAX];
> + char key[PATH_MAX];
> + char ocsp[PATH_MAX];
> };
> TAILQ_HEAD(keynamelist, keyname);
>
> @@ -1323,7 +1326,7 @@ struct relay_cert *cert_add(struct relayd *, objid_t);
> struct relay_cert *cert_find(struct relayd *, objid_t);
> char *relay_load_fd(int, off_t *);
> int relay_load_certfiles(struct relayd *, struct relay *,
> - const char *);
> + const struct keyname *);
> int expand_string(char *, size_t, const char *, const char *);
> void translate_string(char *);
> void purge_key(char **, off_t);
>
--
wbr, Kirill
relayd: support explicit paths for keypair