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From:
hshoexer <hshoexer@yerbouti.franken.de>
Subject:
Re: SEV-SNP: bus_dma(9): Rescind and claim DMA bounce buffer
To:
tech@openbsd.org
Date:
Fri, 6 Nov 2026 10:08:15 +0100

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On Sat, Sep 26, 2026 at 09:17:51PM +0200, Mark Kettenis wrote:
> > Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 20:43:15 +0200
> > From: hshoexer <hshoexer@yerbouti.franken.de>
> > 
> > On Thu, Sep 24, 2026 at 07:33:39PM +0200, Mark Kettenis wrote:
> > > > Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:14:41 +0200
> > > > From: hshoexer <hshoexer@yerbouti.franken.de>
> > > > 
> > > > Hi,
> > > > 
> > > > when creating DMA maps, rescind DMA bounce buffer pages to the
> > > > hypervisor.  When destroying DMA maps, claim these pages back from
> > > > the hypervisor.
> > > > 
> > > > ok?
> > > 
> > > Sorry, too much jargon I'm not familliar with.  Can you explain what
> > > does actually does?
> > 
> > sure:
> > 
> > With SEV and SEV-ES:  For pages to be shared with the hypervisor
> > the guest maps them without the crypt bit (PMAP_NOCRYPT).  That's
> > what we do when setting up pages to be used as bounce buffers.
> > However, the hypervisor can still access "private" pages, e.g. pages
> > that are mapped encrypted by setting the crypt bit in the PTE.  This
> > corrupts the cipher text, pages are not integrity protected.  SEV
> > and SEV-ES only provide "privacy".
> > 
> > SEV-SNP provides integrity protection.  All physcal pages are managed
> > with the so called Reverse Mapping Table (RMP).  The MMU not only
> > uses the information from the page table but also from the RMP.
> > 
> > Pages have to be either assigned to the Hypervisor/Host OS or the
> > guest (VM).  Note: There are more possible page "owners", I'm
> > simplifying a bit.
> > 
> > When the hypervisor touches a guest owned page, #GP is raised.  When
> > a page is owned by the hypervisor, the guest is allowed to touch
> > this page as long as it is mapped unencrypted.  This is what we
> > want to do for bounce buffering.
> > 
> > When the hypervisor forcefully withdraws a page from the guest, the
> > page is "invalidated".  When the guest touches such a page, a #VC
> > trap is raised in the guest.  This allows the guest to detect this
> > "corruption".  That's the integrity protection, SEV-SNP provides.
> > 
> > On guest launch the guest firmware -- SEV-SNP enable OVMF for
> > qemu/KVM -- "claims" all pages assigned to the VM with these steps:
> > 
> > 1) Remove the mapping for unencrypted access, i.e. map it encrypted
> > 2) Request the hypervisor to set "assigned" to "guest owned", using
> >    the GHCB protocol function "page stage change"
> > 3) "validate" the page using the pvalidate instruction.
> > 
> > Afte  that these pages are marked in the RMP to be owned by the
> > guest, the hypervisor can not access these pages anymore without
> > raising #GP.
> > 
> > To share pages with the hypervisor the -- for bounce buffering --
> > the guest "rescinds" pages back to the hypervisor with these three
> > steps:
> > 
> > 1) Set "validate" in the RMP to 0 using pvalidate instruction.
> > 2) Request the hypervisor to set "assigned" in the RMP to  "hypervisor
> >    owned", using the GHCB protocol "page state change"
> > 3) Establish a mapping with the C-bit cleared; with this mapping
> >    the page can be accessed unencrypted.
> > 
> > So, when setting up bounce buffers on dmamap creation, the guest
> > "rescinds" pages.  When destroying the dmamap the guest "claims"
> > the pages again.  Claim and resincd is implemented in diff #1.
> > 
> > Naming is hard.
> 
> Thanks.  I think sun4v used "grant" and "revoke" in the somewhat
> similar case of sharing pages with other domains.

ok, then I will use those.

> I think there is a problem with the diff though in that it breaks
> builds without amdsev enabled...

The "#ifdef AMDSEV" is hidden in  amd64/include/snp.h (see diff #1):

...
#ifdef AMDSEV

#include <uvm/uvm.h>

void	snp_claim_pages(struct pglist *);
void	snp_rescind_pages(struct pglist *);

#else	/* !AMDSEV */

#define	snp_claim_pages(l)	/* nothing */
#define	snp_rescind_pages(l)	/* nothing */

#endif	/* AMDSEV */
...

Shall I move the "ifdef AMDSEV" into bus_dma.c?  Would be more explicit.

> > > > Take care,
> > > > HJ.
> > > > ---
> > > >  sys/arch/amd64/amd64/bus_dma.c | 5 +++++
> > > >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> > > > 
> > > > diff --git a/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/bus_dma.c b/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/bus_dma.c
> > > > index f4efff95a18..2e69319739c 100644
> > > > --- a/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/bus_dma.c
> > > > +++ b/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/bus_dma.c
> > > > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
> > > >  #endif
> > > >  
> > > >  #include <machine/bus.h>
> > > > +#include <machine/snp.h>
> > > >  
> > > >  #include <uvm/uvm_extern.h>
> > > >  
> > > > @@ -255,6 +256,8 @@ _bus_dmamap_create(bus_dma_tag_t t, bus_size_t size, int nsegments,
> > > >  		return (ENOMEM);
> > > >  	}
> > > >  
> > > > +	snp_rescind_pages(&mlist);
> > > > +
> > > >  	sva = va;
> > > >  	ssize = sz;
> > > >  	pgnext = TAILQ_FIRST(&mlist);
> > > > @@ -269,6 +272,7 @@ _bus_dmamap_create(bus_dma_tag_t t, bus_size_t size, int nsegments,
> > > >  			map->_dm_npages = 0;
> > > >  			km_free((void *)sva, ssize, &kv_any, &kp_none);
> > > >  			free(map, M_DEVBUF, mapsize);
> > > > +			snp_claim_pages(&mlist);
> > > >  			uvm_pglistfree(&mlist);
> > > >  			return (ENOMEM);
> > > >  		}
> > > > @@ -307,6 +311,7 @@ _bus_dmamap_destroy(bus_dma_tag_t t, bus_dmamap_t map)
> > > >  		for (pg = map->_dm_pages; map->_dm_npages--; pg++) {
> > > >  			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&mlist, *pg, pageq);
> > > >  		}
> > > > +		snp_claim_pages(&mlist);
> > > >  		uvm_pglistfree(&mlist);
> > > >  	}
> > > >  
> > > > -- 
> > > > 2.47.3
> > > > 
> > > > 
> > 
> >