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rpki-client: parse ASPA eContent using CBS
On Thu, Nov 12, 2026 at 07:25:09AM +0100, Theo Buehler wrote:
> ASPAs have a rather simple eContent and the existing parser can pretty
> much stay as it is. After this change the only remaining OpenSSL type
> that is directly used in aspa.c is the ASN1_OBJECT for the aspa_oid.
> The main side effect is that the parser now enforces DER encoding.
>
> This adds two helpers to rpki-der.c, one for getting the eContent version
> which is a CBS-based reimplementation of valid_econtent_version() and one
> for replacing as_id_parse(). I don't love how one of them warns and the
> other one is quiet, but I also don't like passing warning fragments into
> helpers to make warnings useful. We can polish such things later.
>
> The rest is pretty straightforward. Since there is no templated ASN.1
> macro magic and STACK_OF anymore, we need to count the providers by
> hand, other than that there is not much to say. One could do the parsing
> of the providers in a single pass and build the aspa->providers array
> using a CBB, but I chose to keep things mostly as they are to keep the
> churn relatively small.
>
> This passes the fixture test. There are no ASPAs that aren't strictly
> DER encoded (there still are a few with version 0).
This looks very nice. A few comments below.
> Index: aspa.c
> ===================================================================
> RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/aspa.c,v
> diff -u -p -r1.50 aspa.c
> --- aspa.c 11 Nov 2026 20:08:27 -0000 1.50
> +++ aspa.c 12 Nov 2026 05:54:06 -0000
> @@ -17,91 +17,75 @@
> * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
> */
>
> +#include <sys/tree.h>
> +
> #include <assert.h>
> #include <err.h>
> #include <stdint.h>
> #include <stdlib.h>
> #include <string.h>
> -#include <unistd.h>
> -
> -#include <openssl/asn1.h>
> -#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
> -#include <openssl/stack.h>
> -#include <openssl/safestack.h>
> -#include <openssl/x509.h>
> +#include <time.h>
>
> +#include "bytestring.h"
> #include "extern.h"
> -#include "rpki-asn1.h"
> +#include "rpki-der.h"
>
> /*
> - * ASPA eContent definition in draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-20, section 3.
> + * ASPA eContent definition in draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile-30, section 3.
> */
>
> -ASN1_ITEM_EXP ASProviderAttestation_it;
> -
> -ASN1_SEQUENCE(ASProviderAttestation) = {
> - ASN1_EXP_OPT(ASProviderAttestation, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
> - ASN1_SIMPLE(ASProviderAttestation, customerASID, ASN1_INTEGER),
> - ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF(ASProviderAttestation, providers, ASN1_INTEGER),
> -} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ASProviderAttestation);
> -
> -IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASProviderAttestation);
> -
> -/*
> - * Parse the ProviderASSet sequence.
> - * Return zero on failure, non-zero on success.
> - */
> static int
> -aspa_parse_providers(const char *fn, struct aspa *aspa,
> - const STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *providers)
> +aspa_parse_providers(const char *fn, CBS *cbs, struct aspa *aspa)
> {
> - const ASN1_INTEGER *pa;
> - size_t providersz, i;
> + CBS providers;
> + size_t i, num = 0;
>
> - if ((providersz = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_num(providers)) == 0) {
> - warnx("%s: ASPA: ProviderASSet needs at least one entry", fn);
> - return 0;
> - }
> + assert(aspa->providers == NULL);
>
> - if (providersz >= MAX_ASPA_PROVIDERS) {
> - warnx("%s: ASPA: too many providers (more than %d)", fn,
> - MAX_ASPA_PROVIDERS);
> + CBS_dup(cbs, &providers);
> + while (CBS_len(&providers) > 0) {
> + if (!CBS_get_asn1(&providers, NULL, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER)) {
> + warnx("%s: ASPA: malformed providerAS", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
Would it make more sense to use cbs_get_asid() here and then also do the
other checks done in the second loop here first?
Some of the checks are trivial. The one using the prev element to ensure
the array is a bit trickier so I'm not too fuzzed if that one remains in
the 2nd loop for now.
> + if (++num >= MAX_ASPA_PROVIDERS) {
> + warnx("%s: ASPA: too many providers (more than %d)",
> + fn, MAX_ASPA_PROVIDERS);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + }
> + if (num == 0) {
> + warnx("%s: ASPA: ProviderASSet needs at least one entry", fn);
> return 0;
> }
>
> - aspa->providers = calloc(providersz, sizeof(aspa->providers[0]));
> - if (aspa->providers == NULL)
> + if ((aspa->providers = calloc(num, sizeof(aspa->providers[0]))) == NULL)
> err(1, NULL);
> + aspa->num_providers = num;
>
> - for (i = 0; i < providersz; i++) {
> - uint32_t provider = 0;
> -
> - pa = sk_ASN1_INTEGER_value(providers, i);
> -
> - if (!as_id_parse(pa, &provider)) {
> + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
> + if (!cbs_get_asid(cbs, &aspa->providers[i])) {
> warnx("%s: ASPA: malformed ProviderAS", fn);
> return 0;
> }
>
> - if (aspa->custasid == provider) {
> + if (aspa->custasid == aspa->providers[i]) {
> warnx("%s: ASPA: CustomerASID can't also be Provider",
> fn);
> return 0;
> }
>
> if (i > 0) {
> - if (aspa->providers[i - 1] > provider) {
> + if (aspa->providers[i - 1] > aspa->providers[i]) {
> warnx("%s: ASPA: invalid ProviderASSet order",
> fn);
> return 0;
> }
> - if (aspa->providers[i - 1] == provider) {
> + if (aspa->providers[i - 1] == aspa->providers[i]) {
> warnx("%s: ASPA: duplicate ProviderAS", fn);
> return 0;
> }
> }
> -
> - aspa->providers[aspa->num_providers++] = provider;
> }
>
> if (aspa->num_providers > 1 && aspa->providers[0] == 0) {
> @@ -109,6 +93,11 @@ aspa_parse_providers(const char *fn, str
> return 0;
> }
>
> + if (CBS_len(cbs) > 0) {
> + warnx("%s: ASPA: trailing garbage in ProviderASSet", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
This should not be possible, right? Since the first loop can only succeed
if there is no trailing garbage. If this happens we have some serious CBS
bug.
> return 1;
> }
>
> @@ -117,44 +106,57 @@ aspa_parse_providers(const char *fn, str
> * Returns zero on failure, non-zero on success.
> */
> static int
> -aspa_parse_econtent(const char *fn, void *obj, const unsigned char *d,
> - size_t dsz)
> +aspa_parse_econtent(const char *fn, void *obj, const uint8_t *d, size_t dsz)
> {
> - struct aspa *aspa = obj;
> - const unsigned char *oder;
> - ASProviderAttestation *aspa_asn1;
> - int rc = 0;
> + CBS cbs, econtent, providers;
> + struct aspa *aspa = obj;
> +
> + CBS_init(&econtent, d, dsz);
>
> - oder = d;
> - if ((aspa_asn1 = d2i_ASProviderAttestation(NULL, &d, dsz)) == NULL) {
> + /*
> + * ASProviderAttestation ::= SEQUENCE {
> + * version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
> + * customerASID CAS,
> + * providers ProviderASSet }
> + */
> + if (!CBS_get_asn1(&econtent, &cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
> warnx("%s: ASPA: failed to parse ASProviderAttestation", fn);
> - goto out;
> + return 0;
> }
> - if (d != oder + dsz) {
> - warnx("%s: %td bytes trailing garbage in eContent", fn,
> - oder + dsz - d);
> - goto out;
> + if (CBS_len(&econtent) > 0) {
> + warnx("%s: %zu bytes trailing garbage in eContent",
> + fn, CBS_len(&cbs));
> + return 0;
> }
>
> - if (!valid_econtent_version(fn, aspa_asn1->version, 1))
> - goto out;
> + /* Section 3.1: version MUST be 1 */
> + if (!cbs_get_econtent_version(fn, &cbs, 1))
> + return 0;
>
> - if (!as_id_parse(aspa_asn1->customerASID, &aspa->custasid)) {
> + /* Section 3.2: customerASID contains a positive integer */
> + if (!cbs_get_asid(&cbs, &aspa->custasid)) {
> warnx("%s: malformed CustomerASID", fn);
> - goto out;
> + return 0;
> }
> if (aspa->custasid == 0) {
> warnx("%s: CustomerASID 0 not allowed", fn);
> - goto out;
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + /* ProviderASSet ::= SEQUENCE (SIZE(1..MAX)) OF PAS */
> + if (!CBS_get_asn1(&cbs, &providers, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
> + warnx("%s: failed to parse ProviderASSet", fn);
> + return 0;
> }
> + if (!aspa_parse_providers(fn, &providers, aspa))
> + return 0;
>
> - if (!aspa_parse_providers(fn, aspa, aspa_asn1->providers))
> - goto out;
> + if (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
> + warnx("%s: trailing garbage in ASProviderAttestation", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
In most places you did this check right after
CBS_get_asn1(..., CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
e.g.
if (!CBS_get_asn1(&econtent, &cbs, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
}
if (CBS_len(&econtent) > 0) {
So I would do the same here and move the check up before the
aspa_parse_providers call.
> - rc = 1;
> - out:
> - ASProviderAttestation_free(aspa_asn1);
> - return rc;
> + return 1;
> }
>
> static int
> Index: rpki-asn1.h
> ===================================================================
> RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/rpki-asn1.h,v
> diff -u -p -r1.14 rpki-asn1.h
> --- rpki-asn1.h 7 Apr 2026 11:52:21 -0000 1.14
> +++ rpki-asn1.h 12 Nov 2026 04:52:32 -0000
> @@ -26,22 +26,6 @@
> #include <openssl/x509.h>
>
> /*
> - * Autonomous System Provider Authorization (ASPA)
> - * reference: draft-ietf-sidrops-aspa-profile
> - */
> -
> -extern ASN1_ITEM_EXP ASProviderAttestation_it;
> -
> -typedef struct {
> - ASN1_INTEGER *version;
> - ASN1_INTEGER *customerASID;
> - STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) *providers;
> -} ASProviderAttestation;
> -
> -DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASProviderAttestation);
> -
> -
> -/*
> * Canonical Cache Representation (CCR)
> * reference: draft-ietf-sidrops-rpki-ccr
> */
> Index: rpki-der.c
> ===================================================================
> RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/rpki-der.c,v
> diff -u -p -r1.2 rpki-der.c
> --- rpki-der.c 3 Nov 2026 15:04:31 -0000 1.2
> +++ rpki-der.c 12 Nov 2026 04:52:32 -0000
> @@ -111,3 +111,60 @@ cbs_is_rfc7935_signatureAlgorithm_value(
>
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +/*
> + * Assuming the version is explicitly tagged with default 0, as in
> + * version [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
> + * check whether the version is correctly encoded and matches expected.
> + */
> +int
> +cbs_get_econtent_version(const char *fn, CBS *cbs, uint64_t expected)
> +{
> + CBS version;
> + uint64_t u64;
> + int present;
> +
> + if (!CBS_get_optional_asn1(cbs, &version, &present,
> + CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0x00)) {
> + warnx("%s: failed to get optional version", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + if (!present) {
> + if (expected == 0)
> + return 1;
> + warnx("%s: unexpected version 0", fn);
I would use the same error message from below here:
warnx("%s: unexpected version (expected %llu, got 0)", fn,
(unsigned long long)expected);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&version, &u64)) {
> + warnx("%s: CBS_get_asn1_uint64 failed", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (u64 == 0) {
> + warnx("%s: incorrect encoding for version 0", fn);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + if (u64 != expected) {
> + warnx("%s: unexpected version (expected %llu, got %llu)", fn,
> + (unsigned long long)expected, (unsigned long long)u64);
> + return 0;
> + }
> +
> + return 1;
> +}
So cbs_get_econtent_version() is the first thing that does this fine
grained version checking here. All other helpers manage don't do that.
This function does two things in one go and I think this is why it is
problematic. I would expect cbs_get_econtent_version to just return the
encoded version and then have the callee do the comparison against the
expected version (which could e.g. be valid_econtent_version(fn, x, y)).
Then I think then cbs_get_econtent_version() would not need the extra fn
argument anymore. Also the naming makes more sense then what it is now.
> +int
> +cbs_get_asid(CBS *cbs, uint32_t *out)
> +{
> + uint64_t asid;
> +
> + if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(cbs, &asid))
> + return 0;
> + if (asid > UINT32_MAX)
> + return 0;
> +
> + *out = asid;
> + return 1;
> +}
> Index: rpki-der.h
> ===================================================================
> RCS file: /cvs/src/usr.sbin/rpki-client/rpki-der.h,v
> diff -u -p -r1.1 rpki-der.h
> --- rpki-der.h 3 Nov 2026 14:33:14 -0000 1.1
> +++ rpki-der.h 12 Nov 2026 04:52:32 -0000
> @@ -32,4 +32,7 @@ int cbs_oid_value_matches_nid(CBS *, int
> int cbs_is_sha256_algorithmIdentifier_value(CBS *);
> int cbs_is_rfc7935_signatureAlgorithm_value(CBS *);
>
> +int cbs_get_econtent_version(const char *, CBS *, uint64_t);
> +int cbs_get_asid(CBS *, uint32_t *);
> +
> #endif /* RPKI_DER_H */
>
--
:wq Claudio
rpki-client: parse ASPA eContent using CBS