From: Theo Buehler <tb@theobuehler.org>
Subject: Re: dig warnings
To: tech@openbsd.org
Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 09:34:16 +0200

> would it make sense to do this the other way around? Would a compiler be
> able to catch mistakes that way?

I was considering this but I could not convince clang to throw a warning.
For example, the too short key array in the diff below is fed into
isc_sha256_final() in lib/dns/hmac_link.c:hmacsha256_fromdns(), but
clang is silent about this.

That said, I'm happy to add the array sizes to the function defnitions
if there's any benefit to doing so.

diff --git a/usr.bin/dig/lib/dns/hmac_link.c b/usr.bin/dig/lib/dns/hmac_link.c
index 56c886b9e2f..423a910f4b1 100644
--- a/usr.bin/dig/lib/dns/hmac_link.c
+++ b/usr.bin/dig/lib/dns/hmac_link.c
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ dst__hmacsha224_init(dst_func_t **funcp) {
 static isc_result_t hmacsha256_fromdns(dst_key_t *key, isc_buffer_t *data);
 
 struct dst_hmacsha256_key {
-	unsigned char key[ISC_SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char key[ISC_SHA224_DIGESTLENGTH];
 };
 
 static isc_result_t
diff --git a/usr.bin/dig/lib/isc/sha2.c b/usr.bin/dig/lib/isc/sha2.c
index e1c729d95d5..69915540820 100644
--- a/usr.bin/dig/lib/isc/sha2.c
+++ b/usr.bin/dig/lib/isc/sha2.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ isc_sha256_update(isc_sha256_t *context, const uint8_t *data, size_t len) {
 }
 
 void
-isc_sha256_final(uint8_t digest[], isc_sha256_t *context) {
+isc_sha256_final(uint8_t digest[ISC_SHA256_DIGESTLENGTH], isc_sha256_t *context) {
 	/* Sanity check: */
 	REQUIRE(context != (isc_sha256_t *)0);
 	REQUIRE(context->ctx != (EVP_MD_CTX *)0);