From: Jonathan Gray Subject: mitigate AMD Zen-2 op cache corruption To: tech@openbsd.org Date: Wed, 13 May 2026 11:25:37 +1000 https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7052.html "Improper isolation of shared resources within the CPU operation cache on Zen 2-based products could allow an attacker to corrupt instructions executed at a different privilege level, potentially resulting in privilege escalation." fails to mention the related chicken bit which can be seen in https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=c21b90f77687075115d989e53a8ec5e2bb427ab1 tested on Renoir: cpu0: AMD Ryzen 5 PRO 4650U with Radeon Graphics, 2100.00 MHz, 17-60-01 Index: sys/arch/amd64/include/specialreg.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/arch/amd64/include/specialreg.h,v diff -u -p -r1.122 specialreg.h --- sys/arch/amd64/include/specialreg.h 19 Apr 2026 01:10:28 -0000 1.122 +++ sys/arch/amd64/include/specialreg.h 13 May 2026 00:37:08 -0000 @@ -710,6 +710,9 @@ #define DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_LFENCE (1 << 1) /* Enable serializing lfence */ #define DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_9 (1 << 9) /* Zenbleed chickenbit */ +#define MSR_BP_CFG 0xc001102e +#define BP_CFG_33 (1ULL << 33) /* op cache chickenbit, AMD-SB-7052 */ + #define IPM_C1E_CMP_HLT 0x10000000 #define IPM_SMI_CMP_HLT 0x08000000 Index: sys/arch/amd64/amd64/cpu.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/arch/amd64/amd64/cpu.c,v diff -u -p -r1.205 cpu.c --- sys/arch/amd64/amd64/cpu.c 19 Apr 2026 01:10:28 -0000 1.205 +++ sys/arch/amd64/amd64/cpu.c 13 May 2026 00:43:19 -0000 @@ -1292,12 +1292,18 @@ cpu_fix_msrs(struct cpu_info *ci) if (msr != nmsr) wrmsr(MSR_DE_CFG, nmsr); } + /* Zen 2 mitigations: Zenbleed, op cache corruption */ if (family == 0x17 && ci->ci_model >= 0x31 && (cpu_ecxfeature & CPUIDECX_HV) == 0) { nmsr = msr = rdmsr(MSR_DE_CFG); nmsr |= DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_9; if (msr != nmsr) wrmsr(MSR_DE_CFG, nmsr); + + nmsr = msr = rdmsr(MSR_BP_CFG); + nmsr |= BP_CFG_33; + if (msr != nmsr) + wrmsr(MSR_BP_CFG, nmsr); } /* * Mitigation for Floating Point Divider State Sampling Index: sys/arch/i386/include/specialreg.h =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/arch/i386/include/specialreg.h,v diff -u -p -r1.86 specialreg.h --- sys/arch/i386/include/specialreg.h 19 Apr 2026 01:10:28 -0000 1.86 +++ sys/arch/i386/include/specialreg.h 13 May 2026 00:44:59 -0000 @@ -535,6 +535,9 @@ #define DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_LFENCE (1 << 1) /* Enable serializing lfence */ #define DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_9 (1 << 9) /* Zenbleed chickenbit */ +#define MSR_BP_CFG 0xc001102e +#define BP_CFG_33 (1ULL << 33) /* op cache chickenbit, AMD-SB-7052 */ + #define IPM_C1E_CMP_HLT 0x10000000 #define IPM_SMI_CMP_HLT 0x08000000 Index: sys/arch/i386/i386/machdep.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/arch/i386/i386/machdep.c,v diff -u -p -r1.679 machdep.c --- sys/arch/i386/i386/machdep.c 19 Apr 2026 01:10:28 -0000 1.679 +++ sys/arch/i386/i386/machdep.c 13 May 2026 00:46:16 -0000 @@ -2019,12 +2019,18 @@ identifycpu(struct cpu_info *ci) if (msr != nmsr) wrmsr(MSR_DE_CFG, nmsr); } + /* Zen 2 mitigations: Zenbleed, op cache corruption */ if (ci->ci_family == 0x17 && ci->ci_model >= 0x31 && (cpu_ecxfeature & CPUIDECX_HV) == 0) { nmsr = msr = rdmsr(MSR_DE_CFG); nmsr |= DE_CFG_SERIALIZE_9; if (msr != nmsr) wrmsr(MSR_DE_CFG, nmsr); + + nmsr = msr = rdmsr(MSR_BP_CFG); + nmsr |= BP_CFG_33; + if (msr != nmsr) + wrmsr(MSR_BP_CFG, nmsr); } /* * Mitigation for Floating Point Divider State Sampling